Thinh D. Nguyen
515 Crestwater Ct.
Houston, TX 77082
Tel. (281) 596-0003 (home)
(832) 641- 1212 (cell)
e-mail: nguyendatthinh@aol.com
Date: October 4, 2009
To:
General Stanley McChrystal
Commander of US and NATO Forces in Afghanistan
Dear General,
In the capacity of a veteran from ARVN (Army of Republic of Vietnam) with 23 years of experience in fighting to defend freedom, being attacked in the form of insurgency, I feel that I am obliged to share with you my views about two specific rules in this type of war and also a deep concern in the public opinion.
The first rule in the war against insurgency is avoiding the transportation war, which is happening now in Afghanistan between US Army and the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) buried under the roads. These devices are cheap, easy to make and sometime do not require man-power to operate but they have killed 354 soldiers out of the total of 592 casualties within the last 8 years. This is not an exact figure but still very close to the actual fact. In another term, 60% of casualties happened after the explosion of IEDs. These dead soldiers did not have an opportunity to confront the enemy nor a chance to defend themselves.
A MRAP of Marines rendered unusable by landmines
No general would ever claim that he is in an favorable position of the war against a network of mines. Soldiers deal passively with the fighting only after the explosion. In most cases, the explosion causes damages & casualties to our men immediately, although the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected Vehicles (MRAP) does provide a certain protection to them.
A soldier has told a reporter that “While we can add a thicker armor-plate to the chassis, the insurgents can also make a more powerful IED”. Although this comment is not technical, but it’s not wrong at all; and armored vehicles are not really effective in the war against insurgents.
A road clearance operation
Armor force is not the right response for insurgency problems, still armored vehicles and MRAP continue to be used in convoy escort and road clearance.
By taking a quick look at this photo, we can see that the road clearance does not bring any benefit at all. The insurgents can embed themselves at a distance of 500 meters away from the road without being discovered. Just only half an hour later after the road clearance vehicles went pass, the insurgents can re-surface again and bury dozens of landmines on time to catch the upcoming convoys, without mentioning the possibility that they already managed to bury some landmines in order to pick-up those first armour vehicles sent out for road clearance.
We can avoid and replace the road clearance by other works (to be discussed in a later part) but we can not avoid using the roads for logistics; the supply convoys rely on roads and army operational logistics can not avoid using these dangerous roads. In Iraq , US Army has hired local civilian drivers for their logistics and transport truck, and private security guards to protect these convoys.
Although it is not a perfect solution but still help minimize the loss of military personnel.
The second rule in the counter-insurgency war is to protect civilian life. This is a much harder task than avoiding landmines and minimizing loss of army personnel. The main purpose of civilian protection task is to prevent the enemy from securing food and other resource supply from the locals.
In Vietnam , the civilian protection work had proved to be effective in cutting off supply to Viet Cong, although Vietnam is a huge rice depot. Therefore, for the rugged terrains of Afghanistan , cutting off supply from villagers can proved to be fatal to Taliban forces.
The first thing in the civilian protection task is not to get confused between protecting civilian and defending their villages. If we can avoid the confusion, we can avoid the complex defense system, which comprises of villages, fortresses, artillery, air-powers and the intervention & rescue operations.
This defense system is not just ineffective but also forces the whole ARVN army of 1 million soldiers into a territorial defense position. If that massive power was used to search for Viet Cong and destroy them, the victory could be within a few years, instead of endlessly prolonging the war and ending up in failure.
If we get rid of “defending the village”, we can remove the fencing system surrounding the village and get rid of the passive defense concept. No force is powerful enough to defend a line of 4 kilometers long, assuming a square village of 1 km long for each side.
The trenching & fencing surrounding the village were not able to provide adequate protection to the villagers. Colonel Phan Van Huan, Commander of the 81st Brigade of Commando Parachutists wrote: “The most typical Strategic Hamlet at the time was Luong Son Strategic Hamlet, in the north of Binh Thuan Province . This Strategic Hamlet had a very good defensive system and its hamlet chief is a strong anti-communist man. However, it felt into the Viet Cong control after its hamlet chief was assassinated by a VC infiltrator. It went back to the square: villagers had to pay tax to VC; The People’s Self-Defence Corps patrolled the village during daytime but stationed inside their fortress at night time”.
With a view to strategic war, the Strategic Hamlets have done its role by cutting the VC supply. However, at the same time, they became targets for enemy attacks. While, the People’s Self-Defence Corps of the hamlet had to passively fight the enemy attacks, other forces had to rein in the enemy with more supportive fire powers and reinforcements.
Just the supportive fire powers alone in Afghanistan had stirred up the public opinion because bombs and artillery shells had caused loss of civilian life.
The most effective defensive system is to create a small group, comprising of 30 armed personnel for a population of 1,000 villagers: 3 armed villagers provide protection for every 100, and organize people into cells that form a formidable defensive force.
Colonel Tran Doan Thuong, Commander of Special Force C4 at the 4th Tactical Zone wrote “… The 4th Corps assigned me a task to prevent the Viet Cong from infiltrating from Cambodia . We set up a number of camps along the border and recruited local villagers to form the Irregular Defense Groups. These people were well-trained with ambush tactics so that they can ambush the enemy anywhere on land and waterways. The strength at each camp was numbered at a Company level and was in-charged by a Team A of Special Force. These camps along the border had to constantly ambush the enemy at night time, and patrolled during the day time in their assigned areas.
“The principle is never let VC take initiative. Be sure to leave them in a passive position, while we are in an advance position. The Civil Irregular Defense Group comprised of local villagers, therefore they had no choice but to fight to defense themselves, for safety of their village. They fought with no fear”.
The strategy of “using the locals to protect their village” was initiated and applied effectively by Lieutenant Nguyen Mau while he was the district chief of Thoi Binh. The “Republican Youths”, a force similar to People’s Self-Defence Corps at that time, was in charge of providing protection to their village. The local armed force was in-charged of organizing and commanding these groups, while the regional force played the role of the reserve at a district level.
The effect of “Self-defending without the Strategic Hamlet’s fence” had put the People’s Self-Defence Corps in a position of confronting the enemy directly, by their mind, their intelligence and of course by their own weapons. If the Hamlet chief of Luong Son did not rely entirely on the Strategic Hamlet’s fence, he then would have to be more vigilant with any assassination attempts by VC infiltrators.
Colonel Huan wrote “In strategy, the local forces must carry out Active Night Operation (ANO) in order to gain advantage in the battle field. Night ambush is not as good as ANO as the enemy used to trail our moving force. Therefore, the ambush positions can be easily exposed and our force has to be constantly on the move. The best of all is to practice Night Operation searching for the enemy”.
“Only regional forces can carry out ANO; the allied force can not do this. Without an ability to organize regional forces to carry out ANO in long term, the Taliban will eventually gain advantage from villages to villages and force the ally to withdraw”.
“Apart from the three most important things to do: night ambush, constant moving during ambush and night operation, another important thing to do is “to leave a small element behind the line” in the “wrestling zone”. This will make the enemy confused; can not figure out where we are”.
“During the day time, our force take breaks for rest and meals in concealed and safe area, while at night, we carry out operations searching for enemy. If we are out-numbered by the enemy, supportive fire powers by artillery or air should be called in. If they are in small number, we have to round them up in order to get live POWs as many as possible for intelligent purpose.
Colonel Huan wrote about an ANO carried out by Commando Parachutists “During Tet Offensive 1968, the enemy took advance position into Cay Queo and Cay Thi Junctions in Gia Dinh, which was only 1km away from the Provincial Administrator building. The battle field at Cay Queo Junction was handled by Parachutists, while Marines fought against VC forces in Cay Thi Junction. The fightings still carried on after a week long. The Office of General Staffs assigned me the task to finish off the fightings: I got rid of VC just overnight at the Cay Queo Junction battlefield. Two days later, Commando Parachutists were mobilized to the battlefield at Cay Thi Junction. The battle here became more intense as the defeated enemy force from Cay Queo Junction provided more reinforcement to the enemy force at this location.
I again applied the ANO and it only took me 2 nights to recover Cay Thi Junction. The defeated enemy force withdrawed but was ambushed by Marines outside. More than 100 VC troops were captured”.
Dear General,
Those Taliban insurgents going out at night to bury landmines are now living in hiding in villages in Afghanistan . They will be expelled out of these villages, once People’s Self Defence forces are set up for these villages. On the other hand, carrying out the ANO will help secure stability on main roads, improve transportation and logistics.
You now have between 2,000 to 4,000 trainers to provide military training to Afghanistan forces. The trainings will basically produce and provide an armed force effective enough to relieve the more than 100,000 U.S. and Nato who are now battling the Taliban insurgency.
You should ask yourself what American trainers will provide to Afghan troops. If you find the right answer for this question, you then have half of the key to success. We had paid a heavy price by our own blood for this decisive factor, and above all, the shame of the loss in combat and the fall of our nation’s freedom.
Apart from the two discussed specific rules in counter-insurgency, I also warn that you are not just only dealing with the Taliban insurgents, but also with the American public opinion back home.
In the 1968 Tet Offensive, the US and Vietnamese troops were gaining victories and great advantages over 300 battlefields, but General William Westmoreland was knocked out by the public opinion at Washington. Public opinion was so bad about the Vietnam War that Lyndon B. Johnson, the supreme commander at the time, decided to drop campaign for a second presidential term.
You have a tough responsibility and we wish you every success in your job, and also pray to see the casualty drop by every single day. We deeply love American soldiers currently fighting in Afghanistan , because they are the sons and grandsons of the 58,000 American soldiers, who lost their lives in helping us to defend our freedom.
Yours sincerely,
Thinh D. Nguyen
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